Market Watch 86: FCA finds material surveillance failings at all seven retail brokers visited

Every firm the FCA visited had weaknesses serious enough to require remedial action. If you run market abuse surveillance at a retail broker, this one is for you.

Market Watch 86: FCA finds material surveillance failings at all seven retail brokers visited
Illustration: AI-generated

Action required — retail brokers. Worth reviewing — other firms with market abuse surveillance obligations.

The FCA has published Market Watch 86, reporting findings from supervisory visits to seven UK retail brokerage firms. The focus was market abuse surveillance under UK MAR, the UK Market Abuse Regulation. The headline result is blunt: material weaknesses were found at all seven firms, and all seven were required to take remedial action, in some cases commissioning skilled person reviews to verify that remediation was working. The FCA's conclusion is unambiguous: ten years after its introduction, these arrangements should be well-established. They were not.

Where firms fell short

The failings cluster into four areas.

First, STOR thresholds. A Suspicious Transaction and Order Report (STOR) is the mechanism for flagging potential market abuse to the FCA, and several firms set the bar for reasonable suspicion too high. Some procedures told analysts not to escalate unless they could identify a clear link between a client and the issuer of the securities, even where other aggravating factors were present. Others steered analysts toward closing alerts rather than weighing all available evidence.

Second, surveillance calibration. Some firms applied flat price-move thresholds without adjusting for the difference in volatility between large and small cap stocks. Others set minimum notional trade value parameters so high that a significant proportion of client trading was excluded from monitoring entirely.

Third, governance. Some senior managers responsible for overseeing surveillance had limited understanding of alert triage, investigations, escalation, and calibration. In some cases they were unaware of issues their own surveillance teams had already identified. Where surveillance responsibilities were split across functions, no single individual had end-to-end oversight.

Fourth, quality assurance. The FCA observed a wide range in QA practice, from comprehensive to none at all. Firms with robust QA were better placed to spot trends in analyst decision-making and catch errors early. Some firms assumed that having an alert in place was itself evidence of an effective control; it is not.

On the positive side, the FCA notes that STOR quality improved across the visited firms following remediation, with clearer and more comprehensive explanations of suspicion.

Supervisory outlook

Market abuse risks at retail brokers remain a stated supervisory priority, and the FCA says it will continue assessing STOR arrangements and surveillance controls. It also flags that the findings, drawn from retail broker visits, may be relevant to other firm types.

Market Watch 86 also briefly references CP26/34, the FCA's consultation on the new transaction reporting regime starting 3 April 2028; that consultation closed 6 November 2026 and is not covered here.

What to do

If you run surveillance at a retail broker, read Market Watch 86 against your own arrangements now — the four failure areas are specific enough to run a quick internal check. If you are at another firm type with market abuse surveillance obligations, the FCA says these findings may apply to you too.

Sources